### Some critical notes on time in the multiverse

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Based on joint work with Svend E. Rugh





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Define some sort of a 'supercosmic' time for the multiverse which gives a definite time ordering of the patches (as in the picture).



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There seems to be two ways to establish the possibility of older patches:

- Define some sort of a 'supercosmic' time for the multiverse which gives a definite time ordering of the patches (as in the picture).
- If this cannot be done, then try to extrapolate our 'local' cosmic time concept back through our 'local' Big Bang.

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Indeed, what is time?



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#### Newton: Absolute time



Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything external (1687)

#### Leibniz: Relational time



Space and matter differ, as time and motion. However, these things, though different, are inseparable ( $\sim$  1716).

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• Flows without relation to anything external? How fast does it flow? In the end, Newton might have agreed that time is implicitly defined by the laws of nature, that absolute time is what an ideal clock (a physical process governed by these laws) would measure, and that time is - in this sense - inseparable from motion.

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1. The Weyl postulate. The world lines of fundamental particles (e.g. galaxies) form a bundle of non-intersecting geodesics orthogonal to a series of spacelike hypersurfaces. This series of hypersurfaces allows for a common cosmic time.  $(g_{0i} = 0; ds^2 = c^2 dt^2 - g_{ij}(x, t) dx^i dx^j)$ 



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2. The cosmological principle. The universe is (spatially) homogeneous and isotropic. (FLRW:  $ds^2 = c^2 dt^2 - R^2(t) \left\{ \frac{dr^2}{1-kr^2} + r^2(d\theta^2 + \sin^2\theta d\phi^2) \right\}$ )

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Classical and well-behaved material constituents



### **Option 1: Can we define a supercosmic time?**



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In particular, in the above picture (and in similar pictures from the string landscape), there does not seem to be a homogeneous multiverse with patches obeying the Weyl postulate - which could physically ground a 'supercosmic' time to order the patches.

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Certainly most people would agree that, at least, there is no (known) sensible time concept "before" the Planck time  $(10^{-43} \text{ seconds})$ .

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Finally, it seems to be even more problematic to think of patches 'older' than ours if we consider more radical versions of the multiverse (c.f. Tegmark's level II-IV):

...completely disconnected regions or ...very or fundamentally different laws (time is implicitly defined by laws); ...

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